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Supreme Court Decision Looms
U.S. v. Needham, No. 02-30217, 2003 WL 22953383
(5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2003)
Luke Miller, 2L
In December of 2003, just before the Christmas season
arrived, the Fifth Circuit raked the coals of controversy
when it released a decision interpreting the reach of the
Clean Water Act (CWA). Not following a decision by
the Sixth Circuit only four months prior, and a decision
by the Fourth Circuit only six months prior, the Fifth
Circuit decided that tributaries not navigable, nor truly
adjacent to navigable water, do not fall under the juris-
diction of the federal government.
How the Split Interpretations Arose
The most prominent and recent Supreme Court case
interpreting the coverage of the CWA is Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States, or
SWANCC.1 In that case the Supreme Court limited
CWA jurisdiction from reaching isolated, non-navigable
waters. Instead, waters that were either navigable (which
has several definitions) or adjacent to navigable waters
were appropriately regulated by federal agencies. To
decide if waters were adjacent to navigable water a “sig-
nificant nexus” test was to be used. Having this signifi-
cant nexus is what allowed wetlands, previously not con-
sidered actually navigable waters, to be regulated.
In recent months the interpretation of CWA juris-
diction has focused as much on determining if a body of
Circuits Splitting Over Reach of Clean Water Act
See Clean Water Act, page 8
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Fifth Circuit Upholds “Mitigated FONSI”
Spiller v. White, 352 F.3d 235 (5th Cir. 2003)
Josh Clemons, M.S., J.D.
On December 12, 2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit upheld a lower court’s decision that
federal agencies adequately complied with the law in
determining that operation of the Longhorn gasoline
pipeline would not significantly affect the quality of the
human environment. Longhorn may therefore proceed
with pipeline development and operation.
Legal Path Clear for
Longhorn Pipeline
See Pipeline, page 9
Spirit of the Sage Council, et al. v. Norton, 2003 WL
22927492 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
Leah Huffstatler, 2L
Citing a failure of agency compliance with public notice-
and-comment requirements, the District Court for the
District of Columbia recently struck down two rules
promulgated under the Endangered Species Act. The No
Surprises and Permit Revocation rules were challenged
by several Native American groups and conservation
organizations as violations of the Act’s purpose and pro-
cedurally invalid. 
Background
Described as the “most comprehensive legislation for the
preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any
nation,”1 the Endangered Species Act is designed to con-
serve threatened and endangered species and the ecosys-
tems upon which these species depend. Under the Act,
subject to some exceptions it is unlawful for any person
to “take” any species listed as threatened or endangered.
Generally, “take” means to harass, harm, hunt, wound,
kill, trap or engage in a similar activity. Federal regula-
tions further define taking to include significant habitat
modification or degradation that results in death or
injury of protected wildlife.
In the early 1980s, Congress amended the Act to
permit an otherwise prohibited taking when the taking is
incidental to, and not the object of, an otherwise legal
activity. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National
Marine Fisheries Service — the agencies charged with
enforcing the implementation of the Act — are allowed
to issue incidental take permits (ITPs) to landowners and
developers so long as permit holders enter into a mitiga-
tion plan known as a Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP).
Each HCP must satisfy requirements under the Act and
agency regulations, including the finding that the taking
will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival
and recovery of the impacted species. Furthermore, ITP
applications and their corresponding HCPs are subject
to public comment prior to issuance of the permit. 
The No Surprises rule challenged in this action was a
policy whereby permit holders with approved conserva-
tion plans were assured the ITP would remain in effect
without additional requirements even if circumstances
changed so that the HCP would be inadequate to con-
serve the species. The goal of this policy was to insure
regulatory certainty in exchange for conservation com-
mitments. Various conservation organizations, Native
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Court Strikes Down Endangered Species Act Rules
Publication Announcement
Citizen’s Guide to Conservation Easements in 
Alabama and Mississippi
The Mississippi-Alabama Sea Grant Legal Program
is pleased to announce the recent publication of A
Citizen’s Guide to Conservation Easements in
Alabama & Mississippi. Edited by Josh Clemons,
Research Counsel for the Legal Program, the guide
is intended to acquaint Alabama and Mississippi
landowners with the law applicable to conservation
easements in their states. Summaries of the relevant
state and federal statutes and regulations are provid-
ed, along with the text of the statutes and regula-
tions themselves. The guide is available on-line at
http://www.olemiss.edu/orgs/SGLC/citizen.pdf
and hard copies are available upon request.
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Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. Norton, 338
F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2003)
Josh Clemons, M.S., J.D.
On July 23, 2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
11th Circuit held that the Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers
Coalition has standing to challenge the U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service’s listing of the Alabama sturgeon as an
endangered species under the Endangered Species Act.
The case was remanded to the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Alabama for further proceed-
ings on the merits.
Background – The Alabama Sturgeon
The Alabama sturgeon (Scaphirhynchus suttkusi) is a
small (up to thirty-one inches and four pounds), fresh-
water sturgeon that is very closely related to the
Mississippi shovelnose sturgeon.1 The Alabama sturgeon
was widespread historically in the Mobile River Basin of
Alabama and Mississippi, and was bountiful enough to
be fished commercially, but is presently known to exist
only in “a short, free- flowing reach of the Alabama River
below Millers Ferry and Claiborne Locks and Dams in
Clarke, Monroe, and Wilcox Counties, Alabama.”2 The
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) attributes the stur-
geon’s decline to “over-fishing, loss and fragmentation of
habitat as a result of historical navigation-related devel-
opment, and water quality degradation.”3
The sturgeon has been the subject of official con-
cern under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) since
Jimmy Carter was president.4 The FWS first considered
listing the sturgeon in 1980,5 and published notice of
review of the sturgeon as a candidate for listing in 1982,
1985, 1989, and 1991. During that time, research con-
tinued on the little-understood fish. In 1993, having
assembled adequate data to support a listing decision,
the FWS issued a proposed rule for listing the sturgeon
as endangered.6
Controversial Listing
Like many listing decisions, the sturgeon’s has been
fraught with controversy. The ESA prohibits the “take”
of an endangered species7 and provides for civil and
criminal penalties and citizen enforcement.8 Although
permits may be obtained allowing takes that are inci-
dental to otherwise lawful activities,9 the listing of a
species is generally considered undesirable by those
whose activities may be curtailed thereby – particularly
if those activities are economic.10 The ESA also restricts
federal activities, which may include licensing of
hydropower facilities and operation of dams and locks,
that could destroy or adversely modify habitat designat-
ed as critical for recovery of the species.11 Critical habi-
tat protection potentially burdens economic interests
with additional costs, restrictions, and procedural
requirements.
With these concerns likely in mind, businesses that
use the sturgeon’s habitat (for example, Alabama Power
and barge companies) formed the Alabama-Tombigbee
Rivers Coalition (Coalition) to oppose the listing. The
Coalition attacked the 1993 proposed rule under the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), charging
that the FWS based its decision on the report of an
advisory committee that had not followed FACA pro-
cedures. The courts agreed and the FWS was enjoined
from publishing, using, or relying upon the report in
making the listing decision.12 The FWS withdrew the
rule in 1994 because it was uncertain that any Alabama
sturgeon remained.13
Subsequently, several Alabama sturgeon were col-
lected and the listing process was resumed. The FWS
proposed listing in 199914 and issued the final listing
rule in 2000. The Coalition sued the FWS again to stop
the listing, bringing a smorgasbord of claims ranging
from flaws in administrative procedure to violation of
the U.S. Constitution. (Secretary of the Interior Gale
Norton, in her official capacity, is a named defendant
because the FWS is an agency of the Department of the
Interior. The FWS is also a defendant.)
The Standing Challenge and its Importance
The FWS challenged the Coalition’s standing to bring
this case. Under Article III, § 2 of the U.S. Con-
stitution and the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court
interpreting it, a plaintiff must be able to demonstrate
by evidence the three elements of standing: (1) injury in
fact, that is (2) caused by the complained-of conduct of
the defendant, and is (3) redressable by the relief
requested. The challenge to standing is a mighty
Industry Group Has Standing to 
Challenge Sturgeon Listing
See Sturgeon, page 11
Monroe County v. Ambrose, Nos. 3D02-1716, 3D02-
1754, 3D02-1800, 3D02-2068 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App., Dec. 10, 2003)1
Josh Clemons, M.S., J.D.
In December, the District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Third District, was faced with a question that is becom-
ing increasingly common in coastal areas: when a per-
son buys undeveloped property, and the government
subsequently restricts development, what recourse does
the landowner have?
The Landowners
Between 1924 and 1971, the original plaintiffs (includ-
ing Ambrose) or their predecessors in interest pur-
chased undeveloped land in Monroe County, Florida,
which encompasses the Florida Keys. The land was
properly platted and recorded when purchased. At the
time of purchase, subdivision of the land was governed
only by local law.
A Change in the Law
In 1972, the Florida legislature enacted the Florida
Environmental Land and Water Management Act
(Act).2 One of the Act’s purposes is to “facilitate order-
ly and well-planned development,” which the state is to
accomplish by “establish[ing] land and water manage-
ment policies to guide and coordinate local decisions
relating to growth and development.”3 The Act also
provides that “such state land and water management
policies should, to the maximum possible extent, be
implemented by local governments through existing
processes for the guidance of growth and development;
and…all the existing rights of private property [are to]
be preserved in accord with the constitutions of this
state and of the United States.”4
To further this policy, the Act provides for designa-
tion of “areas of critical state concern,” which are areas
“containing, or having a significant impact upon, envi-
ronmental or natural resources of regional or statewide
importance…the uncontrolled private or public devel-
opment of which would cause substantial deterioration
of such resources.”5 Areas of critical state concern may
be subject to more stringent restrictions on develop-
ment than areas not so designated. The underlying idea
is that areas of importance to the entire state merit the
state’s taking a more active role in the traditionally local
realm of land use planning. In 1979 the Florida legisla-
ture designated Monroe County as an area of critical
state concern, for the purpose of protecting the Florida
Keys from harmful development.6 In 1992 Monroe
County enacted the Rate of Growth Ordinance
(ROGO), which limited new residential units to 255
per year, and established a point system for landowners
to compete for this limited number of building per-
mits.7
The Big Issue: Vested Rights
As a relief valve for landowners who acquired their land
before such restrictions are enacted, § 380.05(18) of the
Act provides
Neither the designation of an area of critical
state concern nor the adoption of any regula-
tions for such an area shall in any way limit or
modify the rights of any person to complete
any development that has been authorized
by…recordation pursuant to local subdivision
plat law, or by a building permit or other
authorization to commence development on
which there has been reliance and a change of
position, and which…recordation was accom-
plished, or which permit or authorization was
issued, prior to approval…of land development
regulations for the area of critical state concern.
If a developer has by his or her actions in
reliance on prior regulations obtained vested or
other legal rights that in law would have pre-
vented a local government from changing those
regulations in a way adverse to the developer’s
interests, nothing in this chapter authorizes any
governmental agency to abridge those rights.
The key language in this section is “vested rights.”
Vested rights are protected from new regulation under
the Act, and other property interests are not.
The major issue at trial was whether the landown-
ers had rights to develop their platted property free
from restrictions imposed by Monroe County pursuant
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Coastal Landowners Suffer Setback in 
Florida Court Decision
to the Act, particularly the ROGO.8 This question
turned on whether the landowners’ development rights
were vested. There is little doubt that the landowners’
development rights would have vested if they had actu-
ally begun building houses before the regulation took
effect. Under Florida common law, “vested rights may
be established if a property owner or developer has (1)
in good faith reliance, (2) upon some act or omission of
government, (3) made such a substantial change in
position or has incurred such extensive obligations and
expenses (4) that it would make it highly inequitable to
interfere with the ac-
quired right.”9 Appar-
ently, however, some or
all of them did not do
so, and therefore did
not have common law
vested development
rights. The landowners
argued that they none-
theless have statutory
vested rights by action
of the “recordation
pursuant to local sub-
division plat law” lan-
guage in § 380.05(18).
The t r ia l  cour t
agreed with the landowners, rejecting the county’s argu-
ment that the phrase “on which there has been reliance
and a change of position” is intended to modify “recor-
dation pursuant to local subdivision plat law” despite
the absence of a comma after the phrase “other autho-
rization to commence development.” Thus, recordation
alone was sufficient to vest development rights and the
landowners have, at a minimum, the right to build sin-
gle-family homes on their lots. The court found the
statutory language to be “clear and unambiguous.”10
What is clear and unambiguous to one court, how-
ever, may not appear so to another. Perhaps unwilling
to believe that the Florida legislature would use an envi-
ronmental protection statute to vest otherwise unvested
development rights, the District Court of Appeal of
Florida, Third District, rejected the trial court’s inter-
pretation of § 380.05(18) and held that “[r]ecordation
alone is not sufficient to establish vested rights.”11 The
appeals court opined that it “would be unconscionable
to allow the Landowners to ignore evolving and exist-
ing land use regulations under circumstances when they
have not taken any steps in furtherance of developing
their land.”12 They would have to show that they relied
to their detriment – that is, substantially changed posi-
tion or incurred extensive obligations and expenses - on
the legal state of affairs in place at the time of recorda-
tion to be entitled to relief.
Conclusion
Because the trial court determined that recordation was
enough to vest rights under § 380.05(18), it did not
determine the detrimental reliance issue. The appeals
court remanded the case to the trial court for fact-find-
ing on that issue. If the landowners ultimately prevail,
they may be enti-
tled to compensa-
tion from the county
or, alternatively, al-
lowed to develop free
of  res t r ic t ions  im-
posed pursuant to the
Act. The outcome is
likely to be appealed
e i the r  way,  and
should be an inter-
esting addition to the
growing body of law
on  the  t en s ion
between private prop-
erty rights and govern-
ment regulation for the public good.
ENDNOTES
1.   This opinion has not been released for publication
in the permanent law reports. Until released, it is
subject to revision or withdrawal. The Westlaw
citation is 2003 WL 22900537.
2.   FLA. STAT. §§ 380.012, 380.021, 380.031,
380.04, 380.05, 380.06, 380.07, and 380.08
(2003).
3.   Id. § 380.021.
4.   Id.
5.   Id. § 380.05.
6.   Id. § 380.0552.
7.   Monroe County Code § 9.5-120 to –124.
8.  Ambrose v. Monroe County, No. 97-20-636-CA-18
(Fla. Cir. Ct., 16th Cir., May 28, 2002).
9.   Monroe County v. Ambrose at *2.
10. Ambrose v. Monroe County at 5.
11. Monroe County v. Ambrose at *2.
12. Id.
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County of Okanogan v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Service,
347 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2003)
Lance M. Young, 1L1
The Ninth Circuit has affirmed a district court ruling
that the U.S. Forest Service has the authority to
restrict water rights in the Okanogan National
Forest for the purpose of protecting endangered fish
species. The County of Okanogan, Early Winters Ditch
Company, and other private plaintiffs brought suit
against the Forest Service for restricting water use from
ditches during periods of low flow, intending to protect
the chinook salmon, steelhead trout, and bull trout.
Plaintiffs alleged that the restriction denied them their
vested water rights under state law. 
Background
The Skyline Irrigation Ditch and Early Winters Ditch
are used for agricultural and other purposes. Feeding
from the Chewuch River, the ditches cross National
Forest land. The U.S. Forest Service grants special use
permits for water use. Permits for both ditches express-
ly state that they are subject to the discretion of the
Forest Service to add terms required by law, federal
standards and regulations. Additionally, they can be
revoked and do not convey any water rights applicable
to the state of Washington.
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires a fed-
eral agency to consult the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) and Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
to determine whether its actions adversely affect an
endangered or threatened species.2 In 1998, water use
permits for the two ditches indicated that amendments
might be necessary, subject to consultation with these
agencies. The Chewuch River is home to the steelhead
trout and chinook salmon. The NMFS, under the ESA,
listed both fish as endangered species. The bull trout,
also native to the Chewuch River, has been listed as a
threatened species by the FWS. 
A biological assessment of the Chewuch River con-
cluded that amendments to the special use permits were
necessary to protect the three species of fish.
Restrictions were placed on the users of both ditches to
increase river levels during low flow periods. Plaintiffs
alleged that the Forest Service, NMFS, and FWS
exceeded their statutory authority. 
The Court’s Analysis
The ESA “amplifies the obligation of federal agencies to
take steps within their power to carry out the purposes
of this act” but it does not give federal agencies addi-
tional authority.3 Plaintiffs contended that the Forest
Service was acting on authority that it did not original-
ly have. The court held that it did have the authority to
place limitations on water use for a number of reasons.
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976 (FLPMA) specifies that ditches granted and
renewed by the Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture
are subject to conditions that “minimize damage to fish
and wildlife habitat and otherwise protect the environ-
ment.”4 This Act does limit the government from ter-
minating permits or rights-of-way that existed before
the Act. The court, however, reasoned that these partic-
ular permits have always expressly stated that they were
subject to government discretion or termination. Even
though the plaintiff ’s water rights were vested under
state law, the permits have never given users an uncon-
ditional fixed right to use the ditches.
Other Acts give the Forest Service authority as well.
The National Forest Management Act gives the Forest
Service specific guidelines to provide for fish communi-
ties.5 The Organic Administration Act, the statute grant-
ing the agency its original authority, requires the Forest
Service to improve forest life and secure favorable water
flows in national forests.6 The Multiple Use Sustained
Yield Act of 1960 (MUSYA) states that “it is the policy
of Congress that national forests are established and
shall be administered for outdoor recreation, range, tim-
ber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.”7
The plaintiffs relied on a Supreme Court decision,
which held that Congress did not intend for the
Organic Administration Act and MUSYA to reserve
water rights for the purpose of preserving wildlife when
establishing national forests.8 The Ninth Circuit
declined to apply that rationale, finding that water
rights and rights-of-way through federal land are legal-
ly different. The FLPMA specifically gives authority to
the Forest Service to restrict rights-of-way. The court
quoted another Supreme Court case to clarify its posi-
tion: “the pending case ‘is not a controversy over water
See Ninth Circuit, page 13
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Water Use Restriction to
Protect Fish
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Earth Island Institute v. U.S. Forest Service, 2003 U.S.
App. LEXIS 24887 (9th Cir. 2003)
T.B. Boardman, Jr., 3L1
The Ninth Circuit recently reversed a Forest Service
decision to log and sell timber from an area that pro-
vides habitat for the endangered California spotted owl.
Earth Island Institute (Earth Island) had attacked the
decision as a violation of the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA)2 and the National Forest
Management Act (NFMA).3 After the District Court for
the Eastern District of California denied the request for
a preliminary injunction to halt the logging, Earth
Island appealed to the Ninth Circuit which held that
certain decisions made by the Forest Service were unrea-
sonable and not in accordance with clear statutory lan-
guage. The appeals court reversed the lower court deci-
sion because Earth Island’s claim demonstrated a rea-
sonable probability of success. 
Background
In August 2001, wildfire swept through the Sierra
Mountains damaging the Eldorado and adjacent Tahoe
National Forests. Following the catastrophe, Forest
Service personnel for each forest developed and imple-
mented management plans to respond. This case
focused on the management plan for the Star Fire area
in the Eldorado forest. The Eldorado plan aimed to pre-
vent another catastrophic fire and to maximize the mon-
etary value of dead trees by allowing logging.
The Eldorado forest is subject to the Sierra Nevada
Framework, a comprehensive conservation strategy that
puts special limitations on logging to preserve its
resources and sensitive habitats such as that of the
California spotted owl. According to the Framework,
the Forest Service must establish a protected area of 300
acres around all known or suspected California spotted
owl sites. These areas are known as PACs, or Protected
Activity Centers. Two PACs are located in the Eldorado
Star Fire area, PAC055 and PAC075. However, the
actual nest of PAC075 is located in the Tahoe forest
along the river boundary of the Eldorado forest. 
Surrounding the PACs is an additional 1,000 acres
that are restricted to limited logging activities. These
areas are called HRCAs, or Home Range Core Areas,
and are established to ensure adequate foraging grounds.
According to the Sierra Nevada Framework, PACs must
be maintained unless the habitat is rendered unsuitable
by a catastrophe and surveys confirm California spotted
owls do not inhabit the area. Additionally, if a PAC is
deemed unsuitable, the Forest Service must attempt to
relocate it somewhere else within that HRCA. 
In March 2002, the Forest Service proposed logging
1,714 acres of the Eldorado forest. Prior to logging the
area, a survey was conducted to assess the Forest Service’s
compliance with the Framework. Even though a pair of
owls was noted in the area, the report concluded that the
habitat appeared unsuitable to spotted owl populations.
Based on the percentage of dead or dying trees, deter-
mined by a Forest Service entomologist, the agency
dropped both PACs from the Eldorado forest plan and
permitted logging of those areas.
Earth Island sought an injunction to immediately
suspend logging, claiming that by dropping the PACs
from the forest plan, the Forest Service had violated
NEPA and the NFMA. The district court denied the
injunction determining that the plaintiffs were unlikely to
succeed on their challenges because the Forest Service was
entitled to rely on its own methodology and experts.
Subsequently, Earth Island appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
Forest Service & NEPA
Relying on the requirement that a federal agency must
“consider every significant aspect of the environmental
impact of a proposed action,”4 Earth Island alleged that
the Forest Service had ignored contradictory data con-
tained in recent studies. Essentially, several studies not
considered by the Forest Service demonstrated that
more healthy trees existed in the area one year after the
fire than the Forest Service had predicted. Citing the
Administrative Procedure Act, which states that an
agency action may be overturned when it is arbitrary or
capricious,5 the Ninth Circuit found that the Forest
Service had provided a reasoned explanation for its deci-
sions as required by NEPA.
Earth Island further contended that the Forest
Service experts relied on factually incorrect data. The
Ninth Circuit emphasized that while an agency need
only demonstrate reasonableness when defending its
use of data and methodology, it must ensure the pro-
fessional integrity of such data and methodologies.
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit charged the district court
to revisit this claim on remand. 
Forest Service Must Reevaluate Spotted Owl Decision
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water is navigable as on what exactly indicates the appro-
priate significant nexus connecting non-navigable water
to navigable water. The first case to make a clear state-
ment on this subject was U.S. v. Deaton.2 Using the idea
that a hydrological connection established a significant
nexus, the court held that a particular wetland became
regulated because it drained into a roadside ditch, which
drained into a navigable river and eventually into the
Chesapeake Bay. A similar case, U.S. v. Rapanos, held
that wetland water that flowed into a man-made drain,
then into a creek, then into a navigable river had enough
of a connection to allow federal regulation of that wet-
land - an obvious extension of the hydrological connec-
tion test.3 The general consensus from these cases is that
tributaries of navigable-in-fact waters have the significant
nexus required by the decision in SWANCC to receive
federal protection. Up until this recent Fifth Circuit deci-
sion, that interpretation of CWA jurisdiction was the last
word officially spoken on the issue.
The split espoused by the Fifth Circuit solidifies the
losing arguments from both the Deaton and Rapanos
cases: i.e. federal jurisdiction over waters not actually
adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters is not a proper appli-
cation of the SWANCC decision and prior precedent.
Review of the Fifth Circuit Case and the Court’s Analysis
As the end of January 1999 approached, a call came
through to the Louisiana Department of Environmental
Quality reporting an oil spill in LaFourche Parish. An
employee of Needham Resources, Inc. (NRI) pumped
some oil from a containment basin into an adjacent
ditch, which flowed into Bayou Cutoff, and then into
Bayou Folse. Bayou Folse happens to flow into the
Company Canal, which in turn expires into the Gulf of
Mexico. Due to the cost of the cleanup NRI could not
complete the task and the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), along with the Coast Guard, took over
the operation. Funding for the government cleanup
came through the Oil Pollution Act (OPA), which sup-
plies government agencies with money needed to com-
plete oil spill cleanups and then reimburses itself by forc-
ing liable parties to pay. In this case, Needham claims
that because the oil was not spilled into a navigable-in-
fact waterway, or spilled into non-navigable waters truly
adjacent to open bodies of navigable water, NRI is not
liable under OPA because no federal jurisdiction exists
where the spill occurred. The bankruptcy court, where
this dispute was first being examined, sided with NRI
and said that neither the drainage ditch nor the Bayou
Cutoff are navigable or sufficiently adjacent to navigable
waters; thus no liability under the federal act was possi-
ble. An appeal by the United States to the regional
District Court yielded the same result. That brought this
case to the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the decision
holding NRI liable, but set the decision apart from the
Fourth and Sixth Circuit decisions regarding federal
jurisdiction over tributaries leading to navigable waters.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
decided that accepting the government’s regulatory def-
inition of what constitutes “navigable waters” (which
includes all tributaries of navigable-in-fact waters) was
too expansive and unsustainable under the SWANCC
ruling. Instead, proximity was the key determination in
establishing if a tributary was adjacent to a navigable
waterway. Tributaries can meet the “significant nexus”
test if they are sufficiently linked to the navigable water.
Accordingly, the proximity and significant nexus
requirements are met if a tributary flows directly into a
navigable body of water.
In the present case, NRI was found not liable in the
lower courts because the waterways discussed were locat-
ed where the discharge of oil had taken place, which
happened to be two or three tributaries removed from
navigable water. Unfortunately for NRI, they stipulated
in those early trials that the oil from their pump station
was found nearly twelve miles downstream in Bayou
Folse. That bayou happens to flow directly into naviga-
ble water; thus it is under federal jurisdiction.
Conclusion and Comparison
It is clear in the Needham decision the Fifth Circuit was
not in favor of expanding jurisdiction to all tributaries
for the CWA or OPA in light of the SWANCC decision.
In its view the expansion requested would push the OPA
to the outer limits of Congress’ power to regulate under
the Commerce Clause and certainly raise constitutional
questions. SWANCC was viewed as reeling in the juris-
dictional limits of the CWA and OPA, and placing
proximity requirements on tributaries if they are to be
considered adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters.
The Fourth and Sixth Circuit decisions were in
favor of expanding jurisdiction for the CWA. Their per-
spectives focused less on defining the ambiguous terms
of adjacency or significant nexus, and more on what the
CWA is intended to accomplish and whether that pur-
pose was supported by the regulation. Citing Senate
Reports, the Sixth Circuit drew attention to the fact
Congress realized protecting navigable waters would
require some effort to control pollution at the source,
possibly in non-navigable waters.4 The Fourth Circuit
Clean Water Act, from page 1
See Clean Water Act, page 10
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The Pipeline
Longhorn Partners Pipeline, L.P., purchased from
Exxon a fifty-year-old, 731-mile petroleum pipeline,
which Exxon had stopped using in 1995, with the goal
of using it to transport 225,000 gallons of gasoline per
day from Houston to El Paso and Odessa, Texas. This
plan alarmed ranchers and other property owners who
depend on water from the Edwards Aquifer system
because the pipeline, which runs over or near the
aquifer and associated wetlands and rivers, experienced
approximately 173 spills during Exxon’s ownership.
The region’s karst geology makes the aquifer particular-
ly vulnerable to contamination from spills because the
overlying rock is relatively porous and permeable. The
City of Austin, through which the pipeline runs, joined
the plaintiffs to protect its interests.
NEPA and the Legal Battle
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
requires federal agencies to follow certain procedures
whenever they undertake “major federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment.”1 NEPA’s purpose is twofold: agencies are to con-
sider enough information to make an informed choice,
and they are to apprise the public of the issues and deci-
sion-making process. To determine whether the action
will have the requisite significant impact, the agency is
to prepare a preliminary document called an environ-
mental assessment, or EA. If the action will have a sig-
nificant impact, the agency must develop a highly
detailed environmental impact statement, or EIS,
which requires substantial additional procedure, time,
and money. On the other hand, if the agency makes a
“finding of no significant impact” (FONSI), the NEPA
process is over and the project can continue.
In the original proceeding, Longhorn and five fed-
eral agencies argued that the pipeline project was not
subject to NEPA at all because it would be privately
owned and operated. Judge Sparks of the U.S. District
Court in Austin found their position to be “not only
arbitrary and capricious, but ridiculous”2 in light of the
pipeline project’s entanglement with, among others, the
Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Department of
Transpor tat ion (DOT).  DOT and the  U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) commenced
the EA process, gathering data and taking comments
from the public. The two agencies apparently disagreed
about the results, with EPA wanting to proceed with an
EIS and DOT preferring to issue a FONSI. The White
House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)
advised the agencies of its preference for a FONSI. The
agencies issued a “mitigated FONSI,” which means that
if Longhorn undertakes certain measures to mitigate
environmental impacts, then those impacts will not be
“significant.”
The plaintiffs then sued to overturn the FONSI, on
the grounds that the agencies’ decision was arbitrary
and capricious. This position is a challenging one for a
plaintiff in a NEPA action, because courts give great
deference to agency NEPA decisions. The agency does
not have to make the “best” decision, it only has to
abide by the process and make an informed decision;
thus, courts will uphold a FONSI if “the agency has
arrived at a reasoned judgment based on a considera-
tion and application of the relevant factors.”3 At trial,
the plaintiffs pointed out a wide variety of issues that
they believed rendered the FONSI invalid: excessive
political influence; uncertainty of enforcement of the
mitigation measures that made the FONSI possible;
uncertainty in the risk modeling; high risk of leaks from
old pipe; environmental impact of pump stations;
potential impact on water supplies; questionability of
Longhorn’s assertion that it could shut down the
pipeline within five minutes of spill detection; cumula-
tive impact with other pipelines; and third-party dam-
age and sabotage.
Judge Sparks rejected the complaints but clearly
was moved by them. Among other things, he was con-
cerned that Longhorn had limited liability and only
$15 million in liability insurance, and that the
Washington, D.C.-based defendants were less than
fully cognizant of regional sociocultural differences
when they reasoned that the risk of the pipeline being
punctured by rifle bullets was low because the proba-
bility of people hunting along the right-of-way in rural
Texas was “remote and speculative.”4 Nonetheless, he
noted “Congress has only authorized federal courts to
ensure the agencies considered all the relevant factors
Pipeline, from page 1
See Pipeline, page 13
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American tribes, and scientists criticized the rule claim-
ing that without ongoing modification of HCPs, listed
species and their habitats would be lost. 
In 1999, while litigation challenging the No
Surprises rule was pending, the government promulgat-
ed the Permit Revocation rule which sets forth the stan-
dards under which an ITP issued pursuant to the No
Surprises rule may be revoked. The government main-
tains that the Permit Revocation rule was merely an
explanation of how pre-existing revocation power would
be applied to ITPs. The plaintiffs, however, claim the
rule was a substantive change in regulations and thus
subject to federal public notice-and-comment require-
ments which were not followed. Also, the plaintiffs con-
tend the rule undermines the purpose of the Endangered
Species Act by imposing a higher standard for revocation
of ITPs compared to those applicable to other permits. 
Ruling
Under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), in
most circumstances federal agencies must publish
notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register
and provide interested members of the public an
opportunity to comment on the proposed rules and
participate in the rulemaking process. This require-
ment applies to rules which are “legislative” or “sub-
stantive” in nature; in other words, rules which “grant
rights, impose obligations, or produce other signifi-
cant effects on private interests,” or substantially cur-
tail an agency’s discretion.2
Due to the interplay between the two rules, the
court looked first at the Permit Revocation rule since a
finding of its invalidity would invalidate the No
Surprises rule as well. The court, noting that the Permit
Revocation rule changed the circumstances under which
ITPs could be revoked and granted ITP holders new
rights not to have their permits revoked, held that the
new rule was indeed substantive and thus subject to the
APA’s notice-and-comment requirement.
The government then asserted that even if the rule
was substantive it was still not subject to the APA’s
requirement because it was the logical outgrowth of a
proposal published in the Federal Register in 1997 and
opened to public comment. If a member of the public
could have anticipated that the proposal would result in
the Permit Revocation rule, the APA requirements
would be satisfied. The court found, however, that the
published proposal did not even suggest a course of
action similar to the Permit Revocation rule and, there-
fore, the Permit Revocation rule could not have been
anticipated by the public.
Finally, the government claimed that by publishing a
Federal Register notice seeking public comment on the
final Permit Revocation rule eight months after the rule
was finalized cured any violations of the APA. Comments
were accepted, but the rule was not repromulgated and
no changes were made. The court found this post hoc
notice and comment insufficient and noted that such a
practice is not in harmony with the APA.
Conclusion
The court vacated and remanded the Permit Revocation
rule for further proceedings consistent with the APA’s
notice-and-comment requirements. The No Surprises
rule was also remanded for further consideration along
with the Permit Revocation rule.
ENDNOTES
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F.2d 227, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
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noted that non-navigable tributaries have a nexus to
their navigable receivers, which could be considered sig-
nificant according to Congressional concern over water
quality and aquatic ecosystems.
Both interpretations have some solid support, like
the Fifth Circuit’s use of Webster’s Dictionary to define
adjacent, or the Fourth and Sixth Circuits’ apparent
support by Congress. It is also clear both sides raise pos-
sible constitutional issues, mostly manifested in federal-
ism questions concerning usurping state authority.
Because of this split and the issues it might present, a
Supreme Court decision may be necessary to clarify the
SWANCC decision and how it is to be applied from
hereon.
ENDNOTES
1. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
2. 332 F.3d 698, 709 (4th Cir. 2003).
3. 339 F.3d 447, 449 (6th Cir. 2003).
4. Rapanos, 339 F.3d at 448 (citing S. Rep. No. 92-414,
at 77 (1972)).
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weapon in the defendant’s arsenal, because a successful
challenge operates as a “get-out-of-court-free” card –
absent standing, the plaintiff ’s case is not justiciable.
Everyone goes home.
The Coalition described several potential injuries,
mostly economic ones related to the procedural and
permitting costs associated with doing business where
an endangered species lives, that it asserted were likely
to be caused by the listing decision. The district court
found that the Coalition did not satisfy the standing
requirement because the injuries were too conjectural,
and/or not adequately traceable to the listing decision,
and/or not necessarily redressable by delisting.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit
reversed the district court, finding that the elements of
standing were present. Because the “machinery of the
ESA” triggered by the listing would almost inevitably
cause the Coalition’s members to incur costs associated
with permits issued by federal agencies that would be
restricted by the listing, and because the members claimed
to be already incurring expenses in response to the listing,
their injuries were not conjectural.15 Because the members
were expending resources not voluntarily but rather as a
result of the “coercive framework” of the ESA, the injuries
were traceable to the listing decision.16 And because cur-
rent and future expenses would be obviated if the listing
were invalidated, the injuries were redressable. The ele-
ments of standing being present, the court remanded the
case to the district court for trial on the merits.
Conclusion
The 11th Circuit’s ruling means the Coalition will get
its day in court to argue against the validity of the deci-
sion to list the Alabama sturgeon as endangered (the
government is not appealing this decision). The sweep-
ing range of the Coalition’s challenges promises to make
this an exciting case to watch for those interested in the
ever-controversial Endangered Species Act. Future
developments will be reported in Water Log.
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Earth Island’s NFMA Claim
Earth Island also argued that several Forest Service deci-
sions violated the Sierra Nevada Framework and thus
the NFMA. First, Earth Island argued that the Forest
Service violated the Framework by concluding that it
could log trees exceeding twenty inches in diameter. The
Ninth Circuit quickly disposed of this claim, noting that
the agency had plausibly concluded that those rules
applied merely to undergrowth thinning in live stands
rather than salvage logging after a fire. 
However, the court did find merit in Earth Island’s
claim that the Forest Service violated the Framework
when it de-listed the PACs and accompanying HRCAs
in the Eldorado forest. The Framework calls for mainte-
nance of these protected areas unless: (1) the habitat is
rendered unsuitable by a catastrophe, and (2) surveys
confirm non-occupancy of the California spotted owls.
While the court noted the great detail provided by the
Forest Service as to why the habitat was unsuitable, it
also recognized that the agency had failed to confirm
non-occupancy. In fact, the Forest Service’s own survey,
as well as Earth Island’s, turned up an owl pair inhabit-
ing the area of PAC075. In addition, the Red Star Fire
Plan in the Tahoe forest, where PAC075’s actual nest
exists, did not de-list the Tahoe Section of PAC075 on
account of the owl pair. 
The Forest Service proposed that if there are obvi-
ously no green trees, or very few trees remaining, sur-
veys are not always necessary. Yet, as the court points
out, the Forest Service’s own data demonstrate that por-
tions of the PAC remain green and therefore warrant a
survey. Furthermore, the Eldorado Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) should have addressed the
potential role of the Eldorado HRCA in maintaining
the Tahoe PAC075. 
The court also noted that regardless of the data, the
surveys are intended to find out whether or not owls are
in the area, despite the determined suitability of the
habitat. Thus, if they are present then the Framework
should remain in place. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
held that the Forest Service may not simply determine
that the habitat is unsuitable and disregard the actual
presence of California spotted owls.
Cumulative Impact Requirement
In addition, the Forest Service had conducted EISs on
the Eldorado and Tahoe forests individually. Earth
Island argued that under NEPA, the Forest Service was
required to prepare a single comprehensive EIS covering
both the Eldorado and Tahoe National Forests.
Alternatively, Earth Island contended that even if a com-
prehensive EIS was not required, the Eldorado study
failed to adequately consider the cumulative impact of
de-listing the Eldorado PAC075 and HRCA that sup-
ported the active PAC075 in the Tahoe forest. 
NEPA requires the agency to provide “the best way
to adequately assess the combined impacts of similar
actions.”6 The Ninth Circuit held that the Forest Service
was not required to prepare a single EIS, reasoning that
Earth Island failed to demonstrate that the agency’s
actions were connected, cumulative, or similar. The
court factored the existence of prior administrative
boundaries, different patterns of ownership and destruc-
tion, disparate timetables, and separate supervisory per-
sonnel between each forest area to support its holding. 
However, even though a comprehensive EIS was not
required, the agency must still adequately analyze the
cumulative effects of the projects within each individual
EIS. The Eldorado EIS failed to assess the potential role
of suitable habitat in the Eldorado forest to support the
nearby PAC075 in the Tahoe forest. This omission
amounted to an insufficient consideration of cumulative
impact under NEPA. Thus, the court held that the
Eldorado EIS failed to adequately consider the cumula-
tive impact of the Star Fire Sale.
Conclusion
While a reviewing court will generally be deferential to
an agency’s choice of methodology and use of data, the
agency decision will be overturned if it fails to follow the
clear intent of Congress. In this case, Congress was clear
that the confirmed presence of owls was a determinative
factor that would prevent logging, an unreasonable
omission by the Forest Service. Additionally, while a
comprehensive EIS was not required for both projects,
the Forest Service failed to factor in the cumulative
impacts that one project would have on another.
ENDNOTES
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rights, but over rights-of-way through lands of the
United States, which is a different matter, and is so
treated in the right-of-way acts before mentioned.’”9
Conclusion
The Federal Land Policy Management Act provides the
government with authority to restrict right-of-way
through national forests. The Endangered Species Act
amplifies the obligation of the Forest Service to use that
authority for the purpose of protecting endangered and
threatened animal species. The effect of this decision
will place a burden on those who depend on the
Chewuch River as a source of water but does not result
in revocation of permits and is within the authority of
the Forest Service. 
ENDNOTES
1.  Lance is a student at the Ralph R. Papitto School of
Law at Roger Williams University, Bristol, Rhode
Island.
2. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
3. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 183 (1978).
4. 43 U.S.C. § 1765(a).
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(A) & (B).
6. 16 U.S.C. § 475.
7. 16 U.S.C. § 528.
8. U.S. v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
9. Utah Power & Light Co. v. U.S., 243 U.S. 389, 41
(1917).
and has not permitted this Court to decide whether the
Court would let Longhorn shoot gasoline through 52-
year-old pipe for 731 miles where failure would be dis-
astrous for thousands of people for years to come”5 and
ruled for the agencies and Longhorn. The plaintiffs did
not go away empty-handed, however. Because the suit
forced the agencies to acknowledge that the pipeline
project was within NEPA’s purview, with the result that
potential impacts were analyzed and mitigated, the
court found the plaintiffs to have “prevailed” such that
they were entitled to recover from the defendants the
costs of litigation.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit and
advanced essentially the same arguments as they did at
trial: that the FONSI was a predetermined outcome
based on a political decision, and thus made in bad
faith; that the agencies failed to follow the NEPA regu-
lations; and that it was impossible to find rationally
that the project would not have a significant impact.6 A
three-judge panel, speaking through Judge Jolly,
affirmed Judge Sparks’ reluctant decision to uphold the
FONSI for the same reason: that Congress intended for
the agencies and not the courts to make these decisions,
and that a court therefore cannot substitute its own
opinion for that of the agencies as long as the agencies
followed NEPA procedures, which in this case they
had. The EA ran to four volumes and 2,400 pages and
was “exceedingly thorough and comprehensive.”7
Further process would be unlikely to supply the sub-
stantive relief the plaintiffs really wanted, which was a
stop to the pipeline project.
Broader Significance
The decision appears to be another rote upholding of a
federal agency NEPA decision, but it has some addi-
tional significance: the Fifth Circuit for the first time
expressly upholds a mitigated FONSI. The mitigated
FONSI concept has been controversial because of the
necessarily speculative nature of the efficacy of future
mitigation measures. Over the years several other cir-
cuits, including the influential D.C. Circuit, have held
that mitigated FONSIs are acceptable, and that is now
the law in the Fifth Circuit as well.
ENDNOTES
1. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
2. Spiller v. Walker, No. A-98-CA-255-SS, 2002 WL
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2003 Federal Legislative Update
Stephanie Showalter, J.D., M.S.E.L.
The following is a summary of federal legislation related to coastal, fisheries, water, and natural resources enacted
during the 108th Congress.
108 Public Law 16 – Nutria Eradication and Control Act of 2003 (H.R. 273)
Authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to provide financial assistance to Louisiana and Maryland for a program to
implement measures to eradicate or control nutria and restore marshland damaged by nutria.
108 Public Law 23 — Ottawa National Wildlife Refuge Complex Expansion and (H.R.298)
Detroit River International Wildlife Refuge Expansion Act
Expands the boundaries of the Ottawa National Wildlife Refuge Complex and the Detroit River International
Wildlife Refuge. The Fish and Wildlife Service is directed to conduct a study of fish and wildlife habitat and aquatic
and terrestrial communities in and around two dredge spoil sites in the Refuge Complex.
108 Public Law 34 – Zuni Indian Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act of 2003 (S. 222)
Approves the settlement of the water rights claims of the Zuni Indian Tribe in Apache County, Arizona. The Act also
establishes the Zuni Indian Tribe Water Rights Development Fund to be managed by the Secretary of the Interior.
108 Public Law 136 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (H.R. 1588)
Reauthorizes and amends the Sikes Act, addressing conservation programs on military installations to require the
Secretary of Defense incorporate in integrated natural resources management plans for military installations in
Guam the management, control, and eradication of invasive species. Authorizes the Department of Defense to par-
ticipate in wetland mitigation banks. Amends the critical habitat provisions of the Endangered Species Act to exempt
DOD lands subject to an integrated natural resources management plan from designation as critical habitat by the
Secretary of the Interior, if the Secretary determines that the plan provides a benefit to the species for which the habi-
tat is proposed. Amends 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(B)(2) to by inserting “the impact on national security” after eco-
nomic impact. Amends the Marine Mammal Protection Act to authorize the Secretary of Defense, after consultation
with the Secretary of Commerce and/or the Secretary of the Interior to exempt any action or category of actions
undertaken by the Department of Defense or its components from compliance with any requirement of this Act, if
the Secretary determines that it is necessary for national defense.
108 Public Law 148 - Healthy Forest Restoration Act of 2003 (H.R. 1904)
An act to improve the capacity of the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of the Interior to conduct hazardous
fuels reduction projects on National Forest System lands and Bureau of Land Management lands aimed at protect-
ing communities, watersheds, and certain other at-risk lands from catastrophic wildfire, to enhance efforts to protect
watersheds and address threats to forest and rangeland health, including catastrophic wildfire, across the landscape.
Authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to implement hazardous fuel reduction programs on certain classes of federal
lands, not to exceed 20,000,000 acres. Hazardous fuel reduction programs may not be conducted on components of
the National Wilderness Preservation System, wilderness study areas, or federal lands on which the removal of vege-
tation is prohibited or restricted by law. Amends § 307(d) of the Biomass Research and Development Act of 2000 to
authorize funding for the development of tools to assist forest managers and research into forest thinning systems.
Establishes the Watershed Forestry Assistance Program to strengthen watershed partnerships, provide best manage-
ment practices to owners of nonindustrial private forest land, and protect water quality. The Secretary is also required
to develop an accelerated basic and applied assessment program to combat infestations by forest-damaging insects
and associated diseases and a healthy forests reserve program for the purpose of restoring and enhancing forest
ecosystems.
Lagniappe (a little something extra)
Around the Gulf . . .
Commercial marine sport fishing has been shown to provide Mississippi with serious money. A recent study by the
Forest and Wildlife Research Center of Mississippi State University reveals that marine sport fishing rings up $31.8
million in economic impacts in the coastal counties and $35.9 million statewide, and supports 585 regional jobs and
100 statewide jobs. These figures will help guide management efforts at agencies like the Department of Marine
Resources, which funded the study. Go dip a line - it’s good sport and good for Mississippi’s economy.
The 2004 Department of Interior appropriations bill, Pub. L. 108-108, includes funding for additional acquisitions
for Gulf Islands National Seashore. $4 million is budgeted for acquisitions on Cat Island, and $1.1 million for por-
tions of Horn Island.
A proposal to fill twenty-four acres of wetlands in Pass Christian, Mississippi, is stirring up controversy, and not just
among wetlands watchers. DuPont Titanium Technology’s DeLisle facility would use the site for additional waste
pits, and area residents fear contamination of groundwater and Mississippi Sound by toxic substances like lead, cad-
mium, antimony, manganese, and tetrachloroethylene (“perc”). Leaks at older waste pits have introduced pollutants
into soil and groundwater, but DuPont claims the new pits will be built not to leak.
Speaking of wetlands, International Paper Company has its eye on 736 acres of them in Moss Point, Mississippi, for
use as a wetlands mitigation bank. The proposed Rhodes Lake Mitigation Bank would allow people to impair or
destroy wetlands elsewhere in exchange for restoration and conservation activities at the bank. The bank requires
approval by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. For more information, contact Michael Moxey of the Corps’ Mobile
District at (251) 694-3771.
And speaking of wetlands, and the Department of Interior, yet again, the DOI is awarding $17 million in grants for
wetlands assistance in coastal areas. Projects funded under the National Coastal Wetlands Conservation Program,
selected in a competitive process, will restore, conserve, and preserve coastal wetlands. States and private partners will
kick in approximately $42 million for the effort. For more information, visit http://www.fws.gov/cep/cwgcover.html.
Officials in Key West are trying to curtail offshore sewage dumping by cruise ships that dock there. Cruise ship
operators typically dump wastewater twelve miles out, easily exceeding the three-mile mandate of the Clean Water
Act. Nonetheless, Key West mayor Jimmy Weekley says the dumping is hurting the Keys’ fragile ecosystem and
wants cruise ships to discharge into the local sewage system instead, for five cents a gallon. Establishing a workable
policy and equipping all cruise ship piers with pumping stations could take up to a year.
Two loggerhead turtles were returned to their native Florida waters after being turtle-napped by Midwestern tourists.
The family of purloining Illinoisans, allegedly unaware that loggerheads are a threatened species, spotted the pair
shortly after they (the turtles) hatched near Port St. Lucie. Fearing for the turtles’ safety, and thinking they (the tur-
tles) might make good pets, the wily grandmother and her two grandchildren collected the beasts and spirited them
away to the somewhat less sea turtle-friendly climes of the Prairie State, breaking state and federal law in the process.
A pet-shopkeeper in their home state alerted them to their crime and may have also advised them that loggerhead
turtles, at 300 pounds when fully grown, do not in fact make good pets. Duly chagrined, the unwitting poachers
returned the turtles to the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service. The government is not pressing charges. The armored
orphans will be returned to their proper habitat in the Atlantic.
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Upcoming Conferences
• March, 2004 •
Aquaculture 2004
March 1-5, 2004 • Honolulu, HI
http://www.was.org/main/FrameMain.asp
The 7th National Mitigation & Conservation Banking
Conference
March 3-5, 2004 • New Orleans, LA
http:www.mitigationbankingconference.com
Rousing the Restless Majority
March 4-7, 2004 • Eugene, OR
http://pielc.org
White Water to Blue Water Initiative Conference
March 21-27, 2004 • Miami, FL
http://www.international.noaa.gov/ww2bw/
First Annual Sustainable Beaches Summit
March 29-31, 2004 • Sandestin, FL
http://www.cleanbeaches.org/sustainable/default.cfm
• April, 2004 •
ICZM Conference 
April 21-24, 2004 • Devon, UK
http://www.science.plym.ac.uk/pass/PASS_ICZM.htm
